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Introduction 
 The 16th and 17th centuries marked a period of transition between the vitalistic ontology that 
had dominated Renaissance natural philosophy and the early modern mechanistic paradigm that 
was endorsed by Cartesian natural philosophers, among others.  However, even with the 
dawning of the 18th century Chemical Revolution, chemistry remained resistant to the mechanical 
philosophy.  What one discovers, when examining the chemical philosophies of the 16th and 17th 
centuries, is that these transitional philosophies involved quite complex and nuanced ontologies 
that cannot be easily classified as either strictly vitalistic or strictly mechanistic. In fact, in many of 
the most important chemical theories of this period, vitalism coexisted quite comfortably with 
corpuscularian theories of matter.  More than this, one also discovers that, to the extent that 
chemical philosophy resisted subsumption under the mechanical philosophy, it was not the 
supplanting of vitalism by mechanism that ushered in the Chemical Revolution.  Rather, this 
revolution in chemistry was brought about by a naturalized and physicalistic, although non-
mechanistic, interpretation of chemical qualities and operations.  This paper will examine these 
ideas by focusing on a few of the more significant transitional chemical philosophies of the 16th 
and 17th centuries, in order to show how chemical philosophers at this time adhered to 
complicated ontologies that only slowly and gradually shifted from a vitalistic point of view to a 
naturalistic and physicalistic, albeit non-mechanistic, account of chemical qualities and 
operations.  For the sake of brevity, I will restrict my discussion to the chemical philosophies of 
Sebastien Basso, Jan Bapstista van Helmont, and Robert Boyle.  I will also examine the work of 
Paracelsus, since his chemical philosophy provides the background for the work of Basso, van 
Helmont, and Boyle.  The role played by these chemical philosophies in the shift from vitalism to 
physicalism is best understood when one focuses on their theories of matter and of vital spirits, 
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and on how the changes in how these notions were conceived ultimately ushered in the Chemical 
Revolution. 
 
Vitalism in Paracelsus , van Helmont, and Basso 
 Vitalism has been generally regarded as the view which claims that ‘vital forces’ or ‘vital 
spirits’ are causally operative in nature, and that the presence of ‘vital force’ or ‘vital spirit’ marks 
the difference between organic and inorganic matter.   Vitalistic descriptions of natural 
phenomena tend to be qualitative, and vitalistic processes tend to be viewed as holistic and 
teleological.  Most importantly for this essay, vitalism views the causes of motion as inherent 
within matter and treats all of nature “as if it were intrinsically active and self-organizing.”1 
Throughout the history of both speculative and natural philosophy, vitalistic theories have often 
been overlaid with theological overtones of one sort or another, and the vitalistic theories 
discussed herein are no exception.  Renaissance and early modern natural philosophers believed 
that they lived in an enchanted universe, that the physical universe did not consist of inert matter 
but either was itself animate (i.e., it contained a ‘world soul’ or anima mundi) or was inhabited by 
vital forces and spirits that played a causal role in the occurrence of natural phenomena.  For 
these philosophers, the presence of a world soul or of vital forces and spirits was ultimately 
attributed either to divine emanation or to divine action.   Another characteristic of Renaissance 
vitalism was that it affirmed a fundamental correspondence between what is above, the 
macrocosm, and what is below, the microcosm.  “The theory of a correspondence between 
microcosm and macrocosm was at the center of a group of ideas derived from the […] mystical-
alchemical tradition crossed with themes common to Neoplatonic mysticism.  The vital 
substances of objects [were] made up of invisible spirits or forces of nature.”2 Natural 
philosophers, or natural magicians as they were called in the Renaissance, were individuals who 
not only studied these vital forces and correspondences but also learned how to deploy them for 
the purpose of controlling or altering natural phenomena.  Vitalism dominated natural 
philosophy during the 15th and 16th centuries as a result of the Neoplatonic and hermetic 
                                                           
1 Society & Knowledge: Contemporary Perspectives in the Sociology of Knowledge and Science, edited by 
Nico Stehr and Volker Meja (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2005), p. 77. 
2 Rossi, Paolo, The Birth of Modern Science, Translated by Cynthia De Nardi Ipsen (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers, 2001), p. 141. 
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traditions that informed Renaissance culture.  It infused the work of such thinkers as Marsilio 
Ficino, Tommaso Campanella, Cornelius Agrippa, and Giordano Bruno and continued to 
dominate natural philosophy well into the 17th century. 
 One discipline within the Renaissance tradition of natural magic that was especially receptive 
to the vitalistic ontology of Neoplatonism was alchemy and, even during the transition from 
alchemy to modern chemistry, lingering elements of the vitalistic standpoint continued to 
resonate within chemical philosophy.  As well, to the extent that chemical philosophy impacted 
on developments in iatrochemistry (i.e., pharmaceutical chemistry) and medicine, vitalism 
continued to also impact these disciplines throughout the 17th and part of the 18th century. 
However, one of the misconceptions that informs much of the literature on this subject is that 
vitalism ended with the advent of corpuscular philosophy and atomism.  At the heart of this 
misconception is the belief that corpuscularism implies mechanism and that, therefore, the 
advent of the corpuscular philosophy is responsible for sealing the lid on the casket of vitalistic 
theories.  However, this is indeed a misconception.  The historical process whereby ancient 
corpuscularism and atomism were revived in the 16th century is, in fact, quite complex.  Although 
the atomism of Democritus and Leucippus was physicalistic and mechanistic, what made it 
possible for particulate matter theory to be resurrected after millennia was the survival, through 
late antiquity, the Middle Ages, and the Renaissance, of the ancient notions of minima naturalia 
and of non-physical semina rerum.  Several medieval and Renaissance theories employed the 
notion of minima naturalia as the smallest possible particles in nature, not further reducible to 
other particles.  By interpreting the notion of minima naturalia as minimum-sized particles of 
reagents, many Medieval and Renaissance alchemists developed their own type of 
corpuscularism or particulate matter theory, called ‘alchemical atomism’, as a qualitative version 
of atomism.  The Neoplatonic notion of semina rerum also played a significant role in the revival 
of atomism in the 16th century for, although the semina were interpreted in the Plotinian and 
Augustian traditions as spiritual archetypes in nature, semina were understood by 
corpuscularians of the late 17th century in much more physicalistic terms.  Although“[m]ost 
historians [and philosophers] of science have considered early seventeenth-century atomism as 
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preparatory to the mechanical theory of matter”3, there is strong evidence to show that, for much 
of the 17th century, chemical philosophers adopted a view of matter that was both corpuscular 
and vitalistic.  In other words, these chemical philosophers adhered to a particulate matter theory 
while also embracing the idea that chemical qualities and operations were non-mechanistic and 
involved the action of vital spirits and ferments.  As Antonio Clericuzio tells us,  
 
[t]he doctrine of spirit played a substantial part in seventeenth-century natural 
philosophy and medicine.  The Neoplatonic spirit of the world [anima mundi] was widely 
adopted by chemical philosophers as a principle of motion and life.  In a hierarchically 
organised universe it was deemed to be a substance originating in the stars and therefore 
superior to the four elements.  This notion became central to chemistry and medicine 
thanks to [Marsilio] Ficino’s De vita Philosophicae (1571).  As William Harvey noted in his 
Exercitationes duae, it [the doctrine of spirits] was often employed as a factotum, in both 
natural philosophy and medicine.4 
 
 In order to understand the complex ontologies that informed the chemical philosophy of the 
16th and 17th centuries, one must understand that chemical philosophy had been involved in a 
process of self-definition and development since it was first articulated as such in the work of the 
controversial alchemist Paracelsus.  Thus, a clarification of the context in which 16th and 17th 
century chemistry evolved is in order.  Chemistry, as a discipline, does not enjoy the same kind of 
long historical tradition that is enjoyed by astronomy, mechanics, mathematics, and physics.  In 
fact, up to the 16th century, chemistry “had no organized structure whatsoever, no theories of 
change and reactions, and no clearly defined tradition.  Like geology and magnetism, chemistry 
became a science between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  Unlike mathematics, 
mechanics, and astronomy, it was itself a product of the Scientific Revolution.”5 As Paolo Rossi 
tells us, in The Birth of Modern Science, “[t]here is no figure like a Euclid, Archimedes, or Ptolemy 
in the history of chemistry.  Instead, modern chemists find themselves in the somewhat 
disconcerting company of alchemists, druggists, iatrochemists, sorcerers, astrologers, and other 
sundry figures.”6 One of the reasons why chemistry was long considered to be the red-headed 
stepchild in the family of science is that, for much of its history up to the 16th century, it was 
                                                           
3 Clericuzio, Antonio, Elements, Principles and Corpuscles: A Study of Atomism and Chemistry in the 
Seventeenth Century (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), p. 37. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Rossi, p. 137. 
6 Ibid, p. 139. 
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primarily a practical enterprise that did not seem to be anchored upon a solid theoretical and 
philosophical foundation.  The scientific status of chemistry was, therefore, dependent upon the 
development of a chemical philosophy and, as surprising as it may seem, the person responsible 
for developing the first genuine chemical philosophy is the infamous alchemist knownw as 
Paracelsus. 
 Despite his legendary fame as a bombastic alchemist and occultist, Theophrastus von 
Hohenheim, a.k.a. Paracelsus, (ca. 1493-1531) was a seminal figure of early chemistry.  Most 
importantly, Paracelsus helped to transform 16th century alchemy by giving it an essentially 
medical identity, and he made this the basis for the development of an alchemical epistemology.7  
Paracelsus made significant advances in medicine by arguing against the Galenic and Scholastic 
view that disease was caused by an imbalance of the four bodily humors, which might be cured 
by bleeding or herbal remedies, and by claiming instead that disease was caused by the presence 
of external agents attacking the body and this could be cured through ‘chemical’ remedies.  He 
identified the characteristics of many illnesses, such as goiter and syphilis, and treated them with 
sulphur and mercury compounds.  He was, therefore, “the first to introduce the medicinal use of 
mineral substances to the practice of medicine.  Chemistry, or the spagyric art, became the 
cornerstone of medicine.”8  By all accounts, however, the characterization of Paracelsus as an 
alchemist and mystic is not a mistaken one.  He fits very well within the Renaissance tradition of 
natural philosophy and natural magic to the extent that the theoretical framework upon which 
his work relies is staunchly vitalistic and not only posits the existence of vital forces and spirits 
but also fully affirms the theory of correspondence between microcosm and macrocosm.  
Paracelsus’s vitalism is, not surprisingly, theological and it shapes his chemical interpretation of 
Genesis, in which creation is understood as a separation of the elements by God.  For Paracelsus, 
“[s]ince the divine creation [is] best understood as a chemical process, then nature must continue 
to operate in chemical terms.  Chemistry [is] the key to nature – all created nature.”9 
                                                           
7 Alchemy and Chemistry in the 16th and 17th Centuries, edited by Piyo Rattansi and Antonio 
Clericuzio, International Archives of the History of Ideas No. 140 (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1994). 
8 Rossi, p. 142. 
9 Debus, Allen G., The Chemical Philosophy: Paracelsian Science and Medicine in the Sixteenth and 
Seventeenth Centuries (New York: Dover Publications, 2002), p. 86. 
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 Paracelsus’s chemical philosophy was based upon three fundamental principles: His theory 
of prime matter, his theory of elements, and his theory of principles.  His theory of prime matter, 
as previously stated, was based upon his chemical interpretation of Genesis in which God is a 
divine chemist who spontaneously created the world ex nihilo.10 Paracelsus’s theory of the 
elements included prime matter (i.e., water) and fire, earth, and air, which were also considered 
matrices.  “Plants, minerals, metals, and animals were the fruit of the four elements.”11 Although 
Paracelsus inherits his theories of prime matter and of the elements from ancient sources, it is 
with his theory of principles that he makes a truly original contribution to alchemy and to 
chemical philosophy.  The principles of chemical reaction, according to Paracelsus, are salt, 
sulfur, and mercury, what he calls the tria prima.  “This tria prima also consist[s] of spiritual 
substances and correspond[s] to the Body, Soul, and the Spirit.  Salt makes bodies solid, Mercury 
makes them fluid, and Sulfur makes them inflammable.”12 
 Although the theory of the tria prima was a modification of earlier sulfur-mercury theories of 
metals, it has a special significance in the rise of modern science because it represents a 
broadening of these theories “to provide an explanation for all nature.”13  For Paracelsus and for 
later Paracelsians, vital spirit is essential for both the organic and the inorganic worlds.  “Spirits 
were conceived as the active agents, upon which all the principal operations in nature and in the 
human body depended.”14  In his De Natura Rerum (1537), Paracelsus states that “[t]he life of 
things is none other than a spiritual essence, an invisible and impalpable thing, a spirit and a 
spiritual thing.  On this account there is nothing corporeal, but has latent within itself a spirit and 
life, which, as just now said, is none other than a spiritual thing.”15 
 Paracelsus’s chemical philosophy, however, was not merely mystical but also contained the 
fundamental elements of what would later become modern chemistry and modern scientific 
method.  Paracelsus’s approach, for example, was solidly empirical.  According to Paracelsus, “to 
attain true knowledge one must abandon the surface of bodies, penetrate their inner nature and 
                                                           
10 Rossi, p. 141. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Debus, Allen G. (2002), pp. 78-79. 
14 Clericuzio, Antonio, “The Internal Laboratory.  The Chemical Reinterpretation of Medical 
Spirits in England (1650-1680)”, in Rattansi and Clericuzio (1994), p. 52. 
15 Paracelsus, De Natura Rerum, as quoted in Ibid. 
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break them up into their constituent parts until each of these is accessible to sight and touch.”16 
To make the constituent parts of bodies accessible to the alchemist, Parcelsus emphasized 
analysis.  However, he “and his followers laid the foundations for viewing analysis as only half 
of the equation – as a necessary preliminary to resynthesis.”17  Paracelsus and his followers thus 
changed the practice of alchemy by emphasizing the twin processes of analysis and synthesis 
(spagyria), to allow them to penetrate the true inner nature of bodies.  When discussing the inner 
nature of bodies, Paracelsus was influenced by Ficino and “placed special emphasis on semina [or 
semina rerum], which he considered as invisible spiritual forces and as archetypes.”18  There are 
clearly echoes here of the Augustinian doctrine of seminal reasons in Paracelsus’s conception of 
semina.  “[S]emina, which originate in the Word [or Logos] are contained in the Yliaster [the 
universal matrix of the cosmos] and are prior to chemical principles and to elements.  Nature as a 
whole is a panspermia”19, that is, the seeds of life imbue the entire universe.  The notion that semina 
are responsible for the generation of natural bodies, including metals in the bowels of the earth, 
continued to influence Paracelsian chemical philosophers throughout the 16th and much of the 
17th century.  Paracelsus’s contemporary, Girolamo Fracastoro, took this Neoplatonic notion of 
semina rerum a step further by combining it with Lucretian atomism and reinterpreting it “in 
terms of invisible units of matter”20 and arguing that semina are also the causes of communicable 
diseases, when they propagate through the atmosphere and penetrate a host organism.  In this 
way, both Fracastoro and Paracelsus greatly advanced the medical theory of disease by moving 
away from a strictly Galenic theory of humoral imbalance and toward the ontological theory of 
pathology and contagion. 
 The notion of semina rerum continued to influence many 16th and 17th century Paracelsians  
who embraced both a vitalistic ontology and a corpuscular and, more specifically, atomistic 
conception of matter.  One of the 17th century Paracelsians whose work is particularly intriguing 
is Sebastien Basso (also known as Basson or Bassonus).  Basso’s Paracelsian chemical philosophy, 
                                                           
16 Bianchi, Massimo Luigi, “The Visible and the Invisible.  From Alchemy to Paracelsus”, in 
Rattansi and Clericuzio (1994), p. 18. 
17 Newman, William R. and Lawrence M. Principe, “Alchemy and the Changing Significance of 
Analysis”, in Wrong for the Right Reasons, edited by J.Z. Buchwald and A. Franklin (Dordrecht: 
Springer, 2005), p. 79. 
18 Clericuzio (2000), p. 18. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid, p. 17. 
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which he developed in his Philosophia Naturalis (1621), “stands out as one of the earliest and most 
articulate expositions of the corpuscular theory of matter.”21  In fact, along with Isaac Beeckman, 
Sebastien Basso is considered to be one of the inventors of molecular theory.  Yet, Basso’s work 
also stands out as a prime example of Neoplatonic vitalism.  By motion, for example, Basso is 
referring to sympathy and antipathy, that is, to attraction and repulsion, and he attributes the 
motions of atoms not to external and mechanistic laws but to the actions of the world soul and, 
ultimately, of God.  We, thus, find in Basso a strong affirmation that all natural phenomena are 
caused by the motions and rearrangements of atoms and, in that regard, he has much in common 
with later mechanistic atomists.  But what distinguishes his views from those of later atomists 
and materialist corpuscularians is that, for him, this motion must be attributed to vital spirit, and 
vital spirit is to be understood in non-material and non-mechanistic terms.  Although Basso’s 
movement toward a corpuscularian theory of matter is a significant contribution to the eventual 
development of modern chemistry, other Paracelsians, such as Petrus Severinus, took even 
further steps towards the development of a theory of vital spirits that would, ultimately, lead to 
the late 17th century reinterpretation of these spirits in physicalist terms. 
 We, therefore, find that, at the end of the 16th and the beginning of the 17th century, the 
chemical interpretation of vital spirit becomes unambiguously chemical, while still retaining a 
strong Neoplatonic tone.  For example, the work of Duschesne and Croll develops the view “that 
medical spirits and spirits extracted by chemists [have] the same source, namely, the spirit of the 
world.  On this basis they stated that the only active remedies [are] those prepared by using 
spirits extracted by distillation.”  22  Such an unambiguous chemical interpretation of vital spirit is 
even more evident in the chemical philosophy of Jan Baptista van Helmont (1579-1644).  For van 
Helmont, vital spirit (Archeus) is conceived as an alkaline volatile salt that moves through the 
body.  Van Helmont states that “[t]he spirit of life receives in the left ventricle of the heart a 
‘divine illumination’, by which it is enabled to preserve and to sustain life […] within the left 
ventricle of the heart, vital spirit is generated from the volatile salt contained in cruor [blood 
without spirit] and by means of a local ferment.”23  Van Helmont theory of spirit, however, still 
                                                           
21 Ibid, p. 39. 
22 Clericuzio (1994), p. 53. 
23 Ibid. 
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retains a strong Neoplatonic tone, although he rejects certain aspects of Neoplatonic thought such 
as, for example, the traditional analogy between microcosm and macrocosm. 
 We find that van Helmon develops an interesting hybrid theory that combines corpuscular 
and quasi-physicalistic explanations of many chemical phenomena with aspects of Paracelsian 
vitalism.  Unlike other natural philosophers before him who had embraced either a notion of 
minima naturalia or of semina rerum, van Helmont’s chemical philosophy embraces both of these 
notions.  However, unlike Frascastoro, van Helmont follows Paracelsus in interpreting semina 
rerum as “the main agents in nature [and as] spiritual, non-corporeal entities.”24 For van Helmont, 
the minima naturalia are interpreted in strictly physical terms as corpuscles.  In fact, “Helmontian 
atoms are identical with the minima naturalia, i.e., the smallest particles into which a substance 
may be divided.  There is little doubt that for van Helmont minima naturalia are actual physical 
units.  [However] [i]t is also apparent that they have qualitative determinations, not mechanical 
properties.”25  Non-mechanical properties are accounted for by the semina rerum, which work 
with the minima naturalia to bring about changes in nature by providing the spiritual force of 
action that brings about qualitative chemical alterations.  Van Helmont claims that, in order to 
provide a mechanical explanation for chemical alterations such as, for example, the mixture of 
substances, one would have to restrict oneself to explaining this phenomenon by considering 
only the mechanical properties of shape, size, and motion.  Therefore, under such a mechanistic 
model, a mixture of substances would have to be explained as the juxtaposition of physical parts.  
However, according to van Helmont, a “purely mechanical juxtaposition of [physical] parts does 
not bring about a real mixture [of substances].”26  It does not bring about a true synthesis.  This is 
why mechanical principles cannot explain chemical reactions.  Instead, van Helmont claims that 
chemical reactions, mixtures of substances, and transmutations depend upon ferments that are 
contained in semina rerum, which are the formative principles from which all natural bodies 
originate.  These ferments are themselves formative spiritual agents and, although analysis and 
                                                           
24 Clericuzio (2000), p. 56. 
25 Ibid, p. 56. 
26 Ibid, pp. 58-59. 
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“reduction of bodies into their minimae partes is a ‘pre-condition’ for transmutation – [it] is 
ultimately a spiritual process.”27 
 Van Helmont explains many physical changes in this manner, changes such as the 
production of a gas for example, and interprets these as changes in “the disposition of the tria 
prima within the corpuscles of water […] The purely material change, that is the attenuation of 
water parts into atoms, is preliminary to a process that is qualitative, not mechanical.”28  
Therefore, physical change takes place in the minima naturalia, but the process of chemical change 
that ensues is the action of semina rerum.  With this nuanced ontology, van Helmont makes 
significant contributions to the development of modern corpucularian theory such as, for 
example, his explanation of certain chemical reactions, such as the “transmutation” of iron into 
copper and the production of glass, in corpuscular terms.29  “Both [chemical reactions] are 
explained in terms of addition and subtraction of particles.  The notion of atoms is also employed 
in van Helmont’s theory of mixture and of generation […] [But] [t]hese corpuscular views by no 
means presuppose a mechanical theory of matter […] [Van Helmont] imposed severe restrictions 
on the corpuscular theory of matter.  Semina rerum and ferments are the active principles on 
which all natural phenomena ultimately depend.”30 
 
Cartesian Mechanism and the ‘Chymistry’ of Robert Boyle 
 In order to understand the reasons why many chemical philosophers of the 16th and 17th 
centuries rejected mechanical explanations of chemical phenomena, one must first understand 
what the mechanical philosophy implied.  ‘Mechanism’, or the mechanical philosophy, is the 
view “according to which matter is inert and all interactions in nature are produced by the 
impact of particles.”31  In this sense, Cartesian mechanism is also reductionistic, that is, all 
qualities (including chemical qualities and reactions) are thought to be reducible to the 
mechanical and quantitative properties of shape, size, and motion.  For reductionists, all higher-
level phenomena and properties are entirely deducible from lower-level properties.  In this view, 
                                                           
27 Ibid, p. 60. 
28 Ibid, pp. 57-58. 
29 Ibid, p. 56. 
30 Ibid, p. 58-61. 
31 Ibid, p. 7. 
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the physical world is represented by particles of matter in motion and can be interpreted 
by the laws of motion determined by statistics […] dynamics [and] mechanics […] 
Natural phenomena such as air resistance, friction, the different behaviors of individual 
bodies, the qualitative features of the physical world were now considered irrelevant to 
the discourse of natural philosophy or viewed as disturbing circumstances which were not 
[…] to be taken into account in an explanation of the physical world.32 
 
 For Cartesian mechanists, “any explanation of natural events requires the building of a 
mechanical model as a ‘substitute’ for the actual phenomena being studied.”33  Mechanical 
philosophy is, therefore, anti-vitalistic and anti-teleological, since it assumes that “nature is not 
the manifestation of a living principle but is a system of matter in motion that follows 
[mathematically precise] laws […] the explanation of natural phenomena excludes all reference to 
vital forces or final causes.”34  For the mechanical philosophy, both inorganic and organic material 
bodies are governed by deterministic and mechanistic laws of motion that are external to matter 
itself.  “[A]ll interactions in nature are produced by the impact of particles”35 in accordance with 
mechanical principles.  For mechanists, matter is not intrinsically active or self-organizing and its 
motions are not self-determined.  Instead, its motions are entirely determined by mechanistic 
causal chains and external laws of motion.  For dualistic mechanists like Descartes, although 
matter itself is not active or self-determined, self-determination exists in the world to the extent 
that minds exist and are active and self-determined.  For materialist mechanists like La Mettrie, 
on the other hand, since only inert matter exists, there is no such thing as self-organization or self-
determination in the world. 
 This view, however, was not dominant in the context of 17th century chemistry, physiology, 
and medicine.  In fact, for many chemists and physiologists, organization and spirit were 
inherent in matter, although in this period of transition, spirit was interpreted in chemical terms.  
“[F]rom the 1650s the notions of spirit (and of fermentation) became central issues […] [many 
English chemists and physiologists] shared the view that matter was endowed with an internal 
principle of organization, life and sensibility, namely, the spirit, which they described in terms of 
                                                           
32 Rossi, p. 122. 
33 Ibid, p. 125. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Clericuzio (2000), p. 7. 
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particles having specific chemical properties.”36  This explains why “the distillation of spirits 
became an important component of seventeenth-century chemistry and medicine […] [for the 
purpose of] identifying and manipulating the spiritual essences extracted from natural bodies by 
means of distillation […] [ and for] ‘capturing’ the spirit of the world, which Paracelsians 
conceived as the celestial vital substance contained in the air.”37   
 This celestial vital substance, or anima mundi, had been identified by Paracelsus as the aerial 
nitre, also called saltpeter or potassium nitrate.  His reason for identifying the vital spirit with 
saltpeter is that potassium nitrate gives off life-sustaining oxygen when heated.  Paracelsus had 
already reflected on what he considered to be the unique properties of saltpeter and had claimed 
that “no other salt in the world is like [saltpeter] […] The part played by Saltpeter in gunpowder 
is one reason why it is different from all other salts, and Paracelsus repeatedly explained thunder 
and lightning in terms of an aerial, windy, or aetherial nitre and sulphur.”38  Paracelsians later 
contended that, in addition to salt, there were two volatile parts in saltpeter, sulphur and 
mercury, which were respectively the soul and the spirit of the aerial nitre.  Based upon 
Paracelsus’s own investigations into the nature of the aerial nitre and upon the Neoplatonic belief 
in the microcosm/macrocosm analogy, the Paracelsians developed the theory that the vital spirit 
originates in the celestial sphere and is carried in the air.  It is then inhaled by human beings and 
reaches the heart, from which it is “carried around the body in a circular motion, imitating the 
divine circularity [of the celestial bodies].  This motion impressed on the blood relates not only to 
the spirit of the blood in the heart but to all of the spirit of the blood in the body.”39  There is, 
therefore, throughout the work of the Paracelsians, a persistent interest in the blood and its 
relation to the vital spirit.  Like van Helmont’s identification of vital spirit with volatile alkaline 
salt, the Paracelsians’ identification of anima mundi with saltpeter and their identification of aerial 
nitre as something that penetrated the body through the blood were important steps toward the 
late 17th century naturalization of the notion of vital spirit and the reinterpretation of this notion 
in physicalist terms. 
                                                           
36 Clericuzio (1994), p. 59. 
37 Ibid, pp. 53-54. 
38 Debus, Allen G., “The Paracelsian Aerial Nitre”, Isis, Vol. 55, No. 179 (1964), p. 47. 
39 Debus, Allen G., The Chemical Philosophy: Paracelsian Science and Medicine in the Sixteenth and 
Seventeenth Centuries (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 2002), p. 235. 
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 It is with this context in mind that I now turn to the work of another transitional figure in 
chemical philosophy, Robert Boyle (1627-1691).  Boyle has generally been regarded by most 
historians of science as one of the principal champions of mechanism in the 17th century and as a 
key figure in advancing the Cartesian mechanical philosophy.  Historians of science point to the 
many writings in which Boyle extolled the virtues of the mechanical philosophy and to his work, 
The Sceptical Chymist, in which Boyle responds to and critiques aspects of spagyrical and 
alchemical philosophy.  Although it is widely known that he was himself a practicing alchemist 
who believed in the possibility of the ‘transmutation’ of metals, it is also the case that Boyle 
attempted to understand transmutation in a way compatible with the mechanical philosophy.  
Aside from Boyle’s own claims in favor of the mechanical philosophy, historians of science also 
point to his corpuscular conception of matter as further evidence of his commitment to 
mechanism. 
 This interpretation of Boyle’s corpuscular philosophy as purely mechanistic was reinforced in 
Thomas Kuhn’s essay “Robert Boyle and Structural Chemistry”, in which Kuhn writes that 
“Boyle’s faith in the corpuscular principles of the ‘Mechanical Philosophy’ is the major source of 
his new emphasis in chemistry upon structure, configuration and motion, as well as a cause of his 
rejection of explanations in terms of inherent characteristics of the ultimate corpuscles.”40  Boyle 
does, indeed, make some very clear statements in favor of mechanism, in his work The Excellency 
and Grounds of the Corpuscular or Mechanical Philosophy (1674). Indeed, the title of this work itself 
conflates the notion of corpuscularianism with the notion of mechanism, as though these notions 
implied each other. 
 However, despite the received view among many historians of science, Robert Boyle’s own 
ontology cannot be easily categorized as purely mechanistic.  A close examination of Boyle’s 
chemical writings, both published and unpublished, shows that “he was far from subordinating 
chemistry to mechanical philosophy, since he did not explain chemical phenomena by immediate 
and direct recourse to the mechanical affections of particles.  As a matter of fact, he regarded 
chemistry as a discipline independent from mechanics.  He explained chemical phenomena in 
terms of corpuscles endowed with chemical, rather than mechanical, properties.  Accordingly, his 
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chemical philosophy can be described as corpuscular, not as mechanical.”41  “One of Boyle’s chief 
scientific pursuits was to explain chemical phenomena in corpuscular terms and to establish 
chemical foundations for corpuscular philosophy […] unlike [many of] his predecessors, Boyle’s 
combination of chemistry and corpuscular philosophy was based on an articulate theory of 
matter and was supported by a substantial amount of experimental evidence […] [Boyle’s theory 
of matter is commonly described as purely mechanical.”42  However,  
 
[a]lthough Boyle often repeated that the mechanical properties of corpuscles were to be 
regarded as the most general notions of natural philosophy, a closer analysis of his 
natural philosophy reveals a number of agents not operating according to the principles 
of mechanical philosophy.  These agents are seminal principles, spirits, and ferments – 
which Boyle conceived as corpuscles endowed with the power of fashioning other parts 
of matter.  The notion of semina is of special importance to the understanding of Boyle’s 
theory of matter, as it was adopted to link his corpuscular philosophy to his theological 
view of nature […] [Boyle was acquainted with the work of Paracelsus, Basso, Sennert, 
and van Helmont.  In fact] [t]he notions of spirit and ferment, which he used in The 
Usefulnesse of Experimental Philosophy [and in the History of Blood] […] testify to Boyle’s 
debts to the Helmontian iatrochemistry.  The notion of ferment occurs also in Boyle’s 
alchemy.  He described the elixir as ferment, a substance which has the power of 
transmutting a huge quantity of matter, many times its weight.43 
 
 From what has already been established, it is clear that Boyle was not unique in both 
embracing a corpuscularian theory of matter and rejecting strictly mechanical explanations of 
chemical qualities. As has been stated, corpuscularism does not entail mechanism and, especially 
in the 16th and 17th centuries, “the acceptance of a particulate theory of matter very rarely 
involved the idea that all natural phenomena could be accounted for by means of particles 
endowed only with mechanical properties.”44  In fact, Boyle concurs with Paracelsian and other 
vitalists regarding the notion that chemical qualities and operations cannot be accounted for by 
reducing them to the mechanical properties of shape, size, and motion of particles.  Although he 
was critical of the Paracelsian doctrine of the theory of principles and qualities, “his criticism did 
not entail that all chemical properties were reducible to […] mechanical attributes.45  “[Boyle’s] 
aim was to reject the notion that sensible qualities were reducible to this or that ingredient of a 
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mixed body.  He [presented] the idea that a quality had relative character, namely, that it was 
generated from the constant interactions of different corpuscles, which themselves might not bear 
the quality in question [and] [h]e himself developed new and more sophisticated ways of 
detecting the chemical qualities of bodies.”46  This suggests that Boyle saw chemical qualities as 
‘emergent’ properties that could not be merely reduced to shape, size, and motion and “refrained 
from establishing a direct relationship between a given quality and a set of mechanical properties 
of the simplest corpuscles.”47  Boyle is, in fact, openly critical of the Epicureans and Cartesians 
who “pretend to explicate every particular Phaenomenon by deducing it from the Mechanicall 
affections of Atomes or insensible particles.”48 
 The question, therefore, is this: How is Boyle able to reconcile his openly professed 
commitment to mechanical philosophy with his resistance to mechanical explanations of 
chemical qualities and operations?  The answer lies in the particulate theory of matter that Boyle 
develops while conducting his early chemical studies.  It is through this complex particulate 
theory that he is able to argue both for the mechanical philosophy and for non-mechanical 
explanations of chemical phenomena.  In his manuscript “Of ye Atomicall Philosophy” (1651-
1653), Boyle equates atoms with minima naturalia, particles that are not further divisible, although 
there is a definite distinction between Boyle’s conception and the Scholastic understanding of 
minima naturalia, in that  “Boyle rules out the Aristotelian notion of form.”49  He states, “by Atoms 
[…] I understand not indivisible Mathematicall points […] but minima naturalia […] because tho 
they may be further divided by Imagination yet they cannot by Nature.”50  For Boyle, the primary 
properties of minima naturalia are understood as mechanical, that is, as shape, size, and motion. 
 However, in addition to adopting the notion of minima naturalia, Boyle also embraces a 
version of the notion of seminal powers to explain chemical qualities, although for him seminal 
powers are not spiritual but corpuscular in nature.  In order to explain the existence of 
corpuscular seminal powers, while at the same time maintaining a mechanistic notion of primary 
properties, Boyle classifies corpuscles into first-order and second-order.  First-order corpuscles 
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(minima naturalia) are described in terms of the mechanistic properties of shape, size, and motion.  
However, second-order corpuscles are compounded corpuscles that are endowed by God with 
seminal powers, that is, with specific “faculties or powers to fashion other parts of matter.”51  
Thus, although Boyle is not a vitalist and any inherent internal faculty of motion to first order 
corpuscles, he does posits second order corpuscles with the special power of generation.  52  There 
is an indication that, for Boyle, the corpuscular seminal powers are emergent properties of 
second-order corpuscles, that is, of compound corpuscles.  In fact, “Boyle maintained that 
chemical qualities depended […] on the way in which the corpuscles that composed a given body 
were disposed to act, or to be acted on by, those of other bodies […] [and that they] emerged 
from the constant interactions of corpuscles passing from one body to the other […] he [thus] 
denied that they directly originated from the mechanical properties of their primary particles 
[first-order corpuscles].”53 
 It is, therefore, clear from this discussion that Robert Boyle, who has been widely regarded as 
embracing a purely mechanistic corpuscular chemical philosophy, in fact holds a very complex 
ontology that is clearly neither vitalistic in the sense of Paracelsus, Basso, or even van Helmont 
nor entirely mechanistic in the manner of Cartesian mechanism.  As a chemist, he is strongly 
committed to explaining chemical phenomena in ways that account for the qualitative changes 
that occur in chemical reactions and ‘transmutations’ and he is, therefore, not satisfied with 
reducing atoms and corpuscles to merely primary and entirely quantitative properties.  
Mechanistic explanations, for Boyle, just cannot satisfactorily account for chemical phenomena.  
However, although Boyle embraces the notions of vital spirits and ferments, he does not interpret 
these in Neoplatonic terms.  Instead, he is instrumental in providing an analysis of vital spirits in 
chemical and physicalistic terms, while avoiding a strictly mechanistic account.  Boyle’s theory 
about the general nature and classification of spirits was, in part, developed during his studies of 
the spirit of blood. Here, Boyle  
 
argued that this spirit was not homogeneous, but a compound substance, of whose 
chemical properties he was keen to give a more detailed account […] In the Memoirs for 
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the History of Human Blood he recorded that from the distillation of blood he had obtained, 
besides oily and phlegmatic parts, a clear liquor which, though probably it contained 
some phlegm, might be called spirit, because ‘it is fully satiated with saline and 
spirituous parts’ […] Boyle’s researches on the spirit of blood – carried out in the 1670s – 
marked an important stage of the development in the chemical study of spirits, since they 
were specifically aimed at finding out the chemical components of vital spirits.  
Accordingly, they brought about the abandonment of the belief that spirit as such – a 
homogeneous and vaguely defined [non-physical substance] – had to be regarded as the 
origin of vital spirit.54 
 
As Clericuzio has argued, “a transformation of the notion of spirit by seventeenth century 
English chemical physiologists permitted them to view vitality as resulting from the chemical 
activity of substances rather than arising from a homogeneous spirit or soul.”55  It is precisely 
when vitality begins to be no longer viewed in theological or supernatural terms and to be 
viewed, instead, in naturalistic, albeit not mechanistic, terms that the stage is set for the advent of 
the Lavoisier’s Chemical Revolution. 
 
Conclusion 
 As can be seen from the above, the shift from a vitalistic to a non-vitalistic theory of mater 
was not sudden and radical but, rather, followed a subtle, nuanced, and gradual path, from the 
16th to the 18th century.  Furthermore, the paradigm that ultimately supplanted vitalism in 
chemistry does not seem to have been mechanism but, rather, physicalism, that is, it was a shift 
from a dualistic ontology of matter and spirit to an ontology in which the only causally 
efficacious factors involved in natural phenomena were thought to be entirely physical and 
empirical factors.  In this shift, the world soul itself was reduced from a spiritual to a physical 
ontological status and was, ultimately, identified with potassium nitrate or aerial niter.  But, this 
physicalistic and naturalistic approach to the articulation of vital spirit and chemical qualities did 
not entail an entirely mechanistic approach.  In fact, for chemical philosophy, physicalism and 
naturalism remained, in many regards, non-mechanistic. 
 Although mechanical philosophy did advance 18th century chemistry to some extent and 
made important contributions such as, for example, the tables of affinity that were “based on 
displacement reactions and were supposed to show the relative strengths of the attractive forces 
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between atoms”56, the mechanical philosophy never quite succeeded in explaining “chemical 
properties such as acidity, alkalinity, metallicity, salinity, and the chemical operations of 
combustion, fermentation, and distillation.”57  “[Although] Newton [for example] had hoped to 
reduce chemistry to a science describing the mechanical interactions between atoms […] that 
hope was not fulfilled […] The Chemical Revolution came about not by any triumph of the 
mechanical philosophy but by a rationalization of these traditional chemical qualities and 
operations.”58  I would argue that this rationalization most definitely occurred with the demise of 
vitalism.  However, this demise did not so much result in the victory of mechanism but, rather, in 
the victory of physicalistic and naturalistic articulation of chemical qualities. 
 
[I]f the revolution chemistry was not mechanical, it was definitely physical […] [and 
resulted from [Lavoisier and his associates] bringing the physical theory of gaseous states 
into chemistry […] The three Aristotelian elements that represented the three physical 
states of matter [air, water, and earth] [were] demolished by the Chemical Revolution 
[…] Lavoisier’s elements were those simple substances that could be analyzed no further 
[…] [and] they were known by chemical […] characteristics […] The final elimination of 
fire as a substance [would have] to wait for thermodynamics and the kinetic theory of the 
nineteenth century.59 
 
With this dissolution of the traditional theory of the elements and with a physicalistic, albeit not 
mechanistic, understanding of chemical properties and operations, 18th century chemistry 
ultimately shed its vitalistic cloak.  But this development was less the outcome of the dominance 
of mechanism than it was the result of a two-century long process, involving alchemists, 
chemists, and chemical philosophers, that slowly transformed and naturalized minima naturalia, 
semina rerum, and vital spirits.  Put briefly, when the world soul became potassium nitrate, the 
‘disenchantment of the world’ had begun. 
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